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No Equal Justice
DAVID COLE†
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the
treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most
unfailing tests of the civilization of any country. A calm
dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused, and
even of the convicted criminal, against the State-a constant
heart-searching by all charged with the duty of
punishment-a desire and eagerness to rehabilitate in the
world of industry those who have paid their due in the hard
coinage of punishment: tireless efforts towards discovery of
curative and regenerative processes: unfailing faith that
there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart of
every man. These are the symbols, which, in the treatment
of crime and criminal, mark and measure the stored-up
strength of a nation, and are sign and proof of the living
virtue in it.
--Winston Churchill1
The most telling image from the most widely and closely
watched criminal trial of our lifetime is itself an image of people
watching television. On one half of the screen black law students at
Howard Law School cheer as they watch the live coverage of a Los
Angeles jury acquitting O.J. Simpson of the double murder of his exwife and her friend. On the other half of the screen, white students as
George Washington University Law School sit shocked in silence as they
watch the same scene. The split-screen image captures in a moment the
division between white and black Americans on the question of O.J.
Simpson’s guilt. And that division in turn reflects an even deeper divide
on the issue of the fairness and legitimacy of American criminal justice.
†

David Cole is a Professor of Law at Georgetown Law School in Washington, D.C.
He received his Juris Doctor from Yale Law School, and he is the author of No Equal
Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System as well as numerous
other journal articles and publications. This article originally appeared as the
introduction to No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice
System.
1
WINSTON CHURCHILL, ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT (JULY 20, 1910), in 2 WINSTON S.
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 1598 (Robert Rhodes James ed.,
Chelsea House Publishers 1974).
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Before, during, and after the trial, about three-quarters of black
citizens maintained that Simpson was not guilty, while an equal fraction
of white citizens deemed him guilty. More people paid attention to this
trial than any other in world history, but neither the DNA evidence nor
the dubious reliability of Los Angeles detective Mark Fuhrman altered
either group’s views on guilt or innocence.
In some respects, the racially divided response to the verdict was
understandable. For many black citizens, the acquittal was a sign of
hope, or at least payback. For much of our history, the mere allegation
that a black man had murdered two white people would have been
sufficient grounds for his lynching. Until very recently, the jury
rendering judgment on O.J. Simpson would likely have been all white;
Simpson’s jury, by contrast, consisted of nine blacks, two whites, and an
Hispanic. And the prosecution was poisoned by the racism of the central
witness, Detective Mark Fuhrman, who had, among other things, called
blacks “niggers” on tape and then lied about it on the stand. To many
blacks, the jury’s “not guilty” verdict demonstrated that the system is not
always rigged against the black defendant, and that was worth cheering.
The white law students’ shock was also understandable. The
evidence against Simpson was overwhelming. Simpson’s blood had
been found at the scene of the murders. The victim’s blood had been
found in Simpson’s white Bronco and on a sock in Simpson’s bedroom.
And a glove found at Simpson’s home had, as prosecutor Marcia Clark
put it in her closing argument to the jury, “all of the evidence on it: Ron
Goldman, fibers from his shirt; Ron Goldman’s hair; Nicole’s hair; the
defendant’s blood; Ron Goldman’s blood; Nicole’s blood; and the
Bronco fibre [sic].”2 The defense’s suggestion that the Los Angeles
Police Department somehow planted all of this evidence ran directly
contrary to their simultaneous (and quite effective) demonstration of the
LAPD’s “keystone cops” incompetence. To many whites, it appeared
that a predominately black jury had voted for one of their own, and had
simply ignored the overwhelming evidence that Simpson was a brutal
double murderer.
But there is a deep irony in these reactions. Simpson, of course,
was atypical in every way. The very factors that played to his advantage
at trial generally work to the disadvantage of the vast majority of black
defendants. Simpson had virtually unlimited resources, a jury that
identified with him along racial grounds, and celebrity status. Most
black defendants, by contrast, cannot afford any attorney, much less a
“dream team.” Their fate is usually decided by predominantly or
2

Jeffrey Toobin, A Horrible Human Event, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 40, 46.
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exclusively white juries. And most black defendants find that their
image is linked in America’s mind not with celebrity, but with
criminality.
At the same time, the features that worked to Simpson’s
advantage, and that occasioned such outrage among whites, generally
benefit whites. Whites have a disproportionate share of the wealth in our
society, and are more likely to be able to buy a good defense; white
defendants generally face juries composed of members of their own race;
and a white person’s face is not stereotypically associated with crime.
Thus, what dismayed whites in Simpson’s case is precisely what
generally works to their advantage, while what blacks cheered is what
most often works to their disadvantage.
Had Simpson been poor and unknown, as most black (and white)
criminal defendants are, everything would have been different. The case
would have garnered no national attention. Simpson would have been
represented by an overworked and underpaid public defender who would
not have been able to afford experts to examine and challenge the
government’s evidence. No one would have conducted polls on the case,
and the trial would not have been televised. In all likelihood, Simpson
would have been convicted in short order, without serious testing of the
evidence against him or the methods by which it was obtained. Whites
would have expressed no outrage that a poor black defendant had been
convicted, and blacks would have had nothing to cheer about. That, not
California v. O.J. Simpson, is the reality in American courtrooms across
the country today.
In other words, it took an atypical case, one in which minority
race and lower socioeconomic class did not coincide, in which the
defense outperformed the prosecution, and in which the jury was
predominantly black, for white people to pay attention to the role that
race and class play in criminal justice. Yet the issues of race and class
are present in every criminal case, and in the vast majority of cases they
play out no more fairly. Of course, they generally work in the opposite
direction: the prosecution outspends and outperforms the defense, the
jury is predominantly white, and the defendant is poor and a member of a
racial minority. In an odd way, then, the Simpson case brought to the
foreground issues that lurk beneath the entire system of criminal justice.
The system’s legitimacy turns on equality before the law, but the
system’s reality could not be further from that ideal. As Justice Hugo
Black wrote over forty years ago: “There can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”3
3

Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
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He might well have added, “or the color of his skin.” Where race and
class affect outcomes, we cannot maintain that the criminal law is just.
Equality, however is a difficult and elusive goal. In our nation, it
has been the cause of a civil war, powerful political movements, and
countless violent uprisings. Yet the gap between the rich and the poor is
larger in the United States than in any other Western industrialized
nation,4 and has been steadily widening since 1968.5 In 1989, the
wealthiest one percent of U.S. households owned nearly 40 percent of
the nation’s wealth. That leaves precious little for the rest.6 The income
and wealth gap correlates closely with race. Minorities’ median net
worth is less than 7 percent that of whites.7 Nine percent of white
families had incomes below the poverty line in 1992, while more than 30
percent of black families and 26.5 percent of Hispanic families fell
below that level.8 The consequences of the country’s race and class
divisions are felt in every aspect of American life, from infant mortality
and unemployment, where black rates are double white rates;9 to public
education, where the proportion of black children educated in segregated
schools is increasing;10 to housing, where racial segregation is the norm,
integration the rare exception.11 Racial inequality, which Alexis de
Tocqueville long ago recognized as “the most formidable evil

4

Keith Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1995, at A1; Keith Bradsher, Low Ranking for Poor American Children, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1995, at A9 (reporting that gap between rich and poor children is larger in
Unites States than any other Western industrialized nation).
5
Steven A. Holmes, Income Disparity Between Poorest and Richest Rises, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1996, at A1.
6
Elmer W. Johnson, Corporate Soulcraft in the Age of Brutal Markets, BUS. ETHICS Q.,
Oct. 1, 1997, at 109.
7
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES – 1993, at 447 (Table 753).
8
Id. at 47 (Table 50), 471 (Table 741), 473 (Table 743).
9
In 1993, the infant mortality rate among whites was 6.8 deaths per 1,000 live births,
while the rate among blacks was 16.5 deaths per 1,000 births. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES – 1996, at
93 (Table 127) (Infant Mortality Rates, by Race). From 1980 to 1995, the
unemployment rate among blacks has always been at least twice that among whites. In
1995, unemployment among blacks was 10.4 percent, and among whites was 4.9
percent. Id. at 413 (Table 644) (Unemployed Workers – Summary: 1980 to 1995).
10
GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DEEPENING SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(Harv. Project on School Desegregation, 1997).
11
DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (Harvard Univ. Press, 1993).
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threatening the future of the United States,”12 remains to this day the
most formidable of our social problems.
This inequality is in turn reflected in statistics on crime and the
criminal justice system. The vast majority of those behind bars are poor;
40 percent of state prisoners can’t even read; and 67 percent of prison
inmates did not have full-time employment when they were arrested. 13
The per capita incarceration rate among blacks is seven times that among
whites.14 African Americans make up about 12 percent of the general
population, but more than half of the prison population.15 They serve
longer sentences, have higher arrest and conviction rates, face higher bail
amounts, and are more often the victims of police use of deadly force
than white citizens.16 In 1995, one in three young black men between
the ages of twenty and twenty-nine was imprisoned or on parole or
probation.17 If incarceration rates continue their current trends, one in
four young black males born today will serve time in prison during his
lifetime (meaning that he will be convicted and sentenced to more than
one year of incarceration). Nationally, for every one black man who
graduates from college, 100 are arrested.18
12

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 340 (George Lawrence trans.,
J.P. Mayer ed., Harper & Row, 1969) (1835).
13
David C. Leven, Curing America’s Addiction to Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 641,
646 (1993) (socioeconomic characteristics of prisoners).
14
MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT – RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,
4 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995) (white and black incarceration rates).
15
In 1996, there were 526,200 black men and 510,900 white men in prison. Fox
Butterfield, Prison Population Growing Although Crime Rate Drops, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 1998, at 18.
16
The average sentence imposed on black offenders sentenced to incarceration in U.S.
district courts in 1992 was 84.1 months, while the average sentence for white offenders
was 56.8 months. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS – 1995, at 474 (Table 5.25) (1996). Although they are only 12 percent of
the population, blacks make up 31.3 percent of those arrested. Id. at 408 (Table 4.10).
Among convicted offenders, 80 percent of black defendants and 75 percent of whites
are sentenced to incarceration. Id. at 471 (Table 5.22); See also David B. Mustard,
Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the US Federal
Courts, (Univ. of Georgia Economics Working Paper, No. 97-458, 1997) (finding that
even under federal sentencing guidelines, and controlling for offense level and criminal
history, black receive sentences six months longer on average than whites); Ian Ayres
& Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 Stan. L.
Rev. 987 (1994) (finding that judges impose higher bail amounts on black defendants).
17
Marc Mauer & Tracy Huling, Young Black American and the Criminal Justice
System: Five Years Later (The Sentencing Project, 1 October 1995) (young black men
under criminal justice supervision).
18
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Charmer, THE NEW YORKER, April 29, 1996, at 116 (100
black men arrested for every one in college).
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In addition, poor and minority citizens are disproportionately
victimized by crime. Poorer and less educated persons are the victims of
violent crime at significantly higher rates than wealthy and more
educated persons.19 African Americans are victimized by robbery at a
rate 150 percent higher than whites; they are the victims of rape,
aggravated assault, and armed robbery 25 percent more often than
whites.20 Homicide is the leading cause of death among young black
men.21 Because we live in segregated communities, most crime is
intraracial; the more black crime there is, the more black victims there
are. But at the same time, the more law enforcement resources we direct
toward protecting the black community from crime, the more often black
citizens, especially those living in the inner city, will find their friends,
relatives, and neighbors behind bars.
I argue that while our criminal justice system is explicitly based
on the premise and promise of equality before the law, the administration
of criminal law—whether by the officer on the beat, the legislature, or
the Supreme Court—is in fact predicated on the exploitation of
inequality. My claim is not simply that we have ignored inequality’s
effects within the criminal justice system, nor that we have tried but
failed to achieve equality there. Rather, I contend that our criminal
justice system affirmatively depends on inequality. Absent race and class
disparities, the privileged among us could not enjoy as much
constitutional protection of our liberties as we do; and without those
disparities, we could not afford the policy of mass incarceration that we
have pursued over the past two decades.
White Americans are not likely to want to believe this claim.
The principle that all are equal before the law is perhaps the most basic
in American law; it is that maxim, after all, that stands etched atop the
Supreme Court’s magnificent edifice. The two most well-known
Supreme Court decisions on criminal justice stand for equality before the
law, and that is why they are so well known. In Gideon v. Wainwright,
the Court in 1963 held that states must provide a lawyer at state expense
to all defendants charged with a serious crime who cannot afford to hire
their own lawyer.22 The story became a best-selling book and an awardwinning motion picture. Three years later, in Miranda v. Arizona, the
19

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME VICTIMIZATION IN
CITY, SUBURBAN, AND RURAL AREAS: A NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY
REPORT, 6 (June 1992).
20
JOHN HAGEN & RUTH PETERSON, CRIME AND INEQUALITY 25 (Stanford Univ. Press
1995).
21
Id. at 16.
22
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
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Court required the police to provide poor suspects with an attorney at
state expense and to inform all suspects of their rights before questioning
them in custody.23 In these landmark decisions, the Court sought to
ameliorate societal inequalities—both among suspects and between
suspects and the state—that undermined the criminal justice system’s
promise of equality. As the Court stated in Miranda, “[w]hile authorities
are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have the
obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of
justice.”24
The prominence of these decisions, however, is misleading.
They were both decided by the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl
Warren, at a time when the Court was solidly liberal and strongly
committed to racial and economic equality. At virtually every juncture
since Gideon and Miranda, the Supreme Court has undercut the principle
of equality reflected in those decisions, and has itself “take[n] advantage
of indigence in the administration of justice.” Today, those decisions
stand out as anomalies. Gideon is a symbol of equality unrealized in
practice; poor defendants are nominally entitled to the assistance of
counsel at trial, but the Supreme Court has failed to demand that the
assistance be meaningful. Lawyers who have slept through testimony or
appeared in court drunk have nonetheless been deemed to have provided
their indigent clients “effective assistance of counsel.”25 And today’s
Court has so diluted Miranda that the decision has had little effect on
actual police interrogation practices.
The exploitation of inequality in criminal justice is driven by the
need to balance two fundamental and competing interests: the protection
of constitutional rights, and the protection of law-abiding citizens from
crime. Virtually all constitutional protections in criminal justice have a
cost: they make the identification and prosecution of suspected criminals
more difficult. Without a constitutional requirement that police have
probable cause and a warrant before they conduct searches, for example,
police officers would be far more effective in rooting out and stopping
crime. Without jury trials, criminal justice administration would be
much more efficient. But if police could enter our homes whenever they
pleased, we would live in a police state, with no meaningful privacy
protection. And absent jury trials, the community would have little
check on overzealous prosecutors. Much of the public and academic
23

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
Id. at 472.
25
See, e.g., Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); McFarland v.
State, 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
24
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debate about criminal justice focuses on where we should draw the line
between law enforcement interests and constitutional protections.
Liberals tend to argue for more rights-protective rules, while
conservatives tend to advocate rules that give law enforcement more
leeway. Both sides agree, at least in principle, that the line should be
drawn in the same place for everyone.
In fact, however, we have repeatedly mediated the tension not by
picking one point on the continuum, but in effect by picking two
points—one for the more privileged and educated, the other for the poor
and less educated. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that the
Fourth Amendment bars police from searching luggage, purses, or
wallets without a warrant that is based on probable cause to believe
evidence of crime will be found.26 But at the same time, the Court
permits police officers to approach any citizen—without any basis for
suspicion—and request “consent” to search.27 The officer need not
inform the suspect that he has a right to say so. This tactic, not
surprisingly, is popular among the police, and is disproportionately
targeted at young black men, who are less likely to assert their right to
say no. In this way, the privacy of the privileged is guaranteed, but the
police still get their evidence, and society does not have to pay the cost
in increased crime of extending to everyone the right to privacy that the
privileged enjoy. This pattern is repeated throughout the criminal justice
system: the Court affirms a constitutional right, but in a manner that
effectively protects the right only for the privileged few, while as a
practical matter denying the right to those who are less privileged. By
exploiting society’s “background” inequality, the Court sidesteps the
difficult question of how much constitutional protection we could afford
if we were willing to ensure that it was enjoyed equally by all people.
Nor is the Supreme Court alone in exploiting inequality in this
way. If there is a common theme in criminal justice policy in America, it
is that we consistently seek to avoid difficult trade-offs by exploiting
inequality. Politicians impose the most serious criminal sanctions on
conduct in which they and their constituents are least likely to engage.
Thus, a predominantly white Congress has mandated prison sentences
for the possession and distribution of crack cocaine one hundred times
more severe than the penalties for powder cocaine.28 African Americans
26

See, e.g., Ark. v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
28
18 U.S.C. Appx § 2D1.1 (setting equal base offense levels for federal sentencing for
possession of powder cocaine and crack cocaine where amount of powder cocaine is
100 times greater than crack cocaine).
27
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comprise more than 90 percent of those found guilty of crack cocaine
crimes, but only 20 percent of those found guilty of powder cocaine
crimes. By contrast, when white youth began smoking marijuana in
large numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, state legislatures responded by
reducing penalties and in some states effectively decriminalizing
marijuana possession. More broadly, it is unimaginable that our
country’s heavy reliance on incarceration would be tolerated if the
black/white incarceration rates were reversed, and whites were
incarcerated at seven times the rate that blacks are. The white majority
can “afford” the costs associated with mass incarceration because the
incarcerated mass is disproportionately nonwhite.
Similarly, police officers routinely use methods of investigation
and interrogation against members of racial minorities and the poor that
would be deemed unacceptable if applied to more privileged members of
the community. “Consent” searches, pre-textual traffic stops, and
“quality of life” policing are all disproportionately used against black
citizens. Courts assign attorneys to defend the poor in serious criminal
trials whom the wealthy would not hire to represent them in traffic court.
And jury commissioners and lawyers have long engaged in
discriminatory practices that result in disproportionately white juries.
Those double standards are not, of course, explicit; on the face of
it, the criminal law is color-blind and class-blind. But in a sense, this
only makes the problem worse. The rhetoric of the criminal justice
system sends the message that our society carefully protects everyone’s
constitutional rights, but in practice the rules assure that law enforcement
prerogatives will generally prevail over the rights of minorities and the
poor.
By affording criminal suspects substantial constitutional
protections in theory, the Supreme Court validated the results of the
criminal justice system as fair. That formal fairness obscures the
systemic concerns that ought to be raised by the fact that the prison
population is overwhelmingly poor and disproportionately black.29
I am not suggesting that the disproportionate results of the
criminal justice system are wholly attributable to racism, nor that the
double standards are intentionally designed to harm members of minority
groups and the poor. Intent and motive are notoriously difficult to
fathom, particularly where there are multiple actors and decision makers,
and I do not set out to prove intentional discrimination. In fact, I think it
more likely that the double standards have developed because they are
convenient mechanisms for avoiding hard questions about competing
interests, and it is human nature to avoid hard questions. But whatever
29

See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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the reasons, we have established two systems of criminal justice: one for
the privileged, and another for the less privileged. Some of the
distinctions are based on race, others on class, but in no true sense can it
be said that all are equal before the criminal law. Thus, I take issue with
those, like Professor Randall Kennedy, who argue that as long as we can
rid the criminal justice system of explicit and intentional considerations
of race, we will have solved the problem of inequality in criminal
justice.30 The problems canvassed in this book for the most part do not
stem from explicit and intentional race or class discrimination, but they
are problems of inequality nonetheless. To suggest that a “color-blind”
set of rules is sufficient is to ignore the lion’s share of inequality that
pervades the criminal justice system today. The disparities I discuss are
built into the very structure and doctrine of our criminal justice system,
and unless and until we acknowledge and remedy them, we will have
“no equal justice.”
Equality in criminal justice does not necessarily mean more
rights for the criminally accused. Indeed, I think it likely that were we to
commit ourselves to equality, the substantive scope of constitutional
protections accorded to the accused would be reduced, not expanded. If
we had to pay full cost, in law enforcement terms, for the constitutional
rights we now claim to protect, the scope of those constitutional rights
would probably be cut back for all. But at least we would then strike the
balance between law enforcement and constitutional rights honestly.
Much of this book will be dedicated to demonstrating how the
double standards in criminal justice operate. Some readers will need
more convincing than others on this score. By a detailed description of
the problem, I hope to shake the confidence of those who believe the
system is fair. But I also hope to demonstrate to those more skeptical of
the system that the problems cannot be explained by simple charges of
racism, and cannot be solved by banning intentional racism from the
system. I discuss in turn the constitutional rules governing police
practices, the provision of legal representation to those who cannot
afford it, jury discrimination, disparities in sentencing, and legal
challenges to discrimination in the criminal justice system. In each of
these areas, we have “used” inequality to forge an illegitimate
compromise between law enforcement needs and constitutional rights.
Sometimes the double standard is achieved by exploiting ignorance, as in
the Supreme Court’s refusal to require police officers to inform suspects
of their right to say no when they are asked to “consent” to a search.
Sometimes the double standard stems from the different resources that
30

RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (Pantheon Books 1997).
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rich and poor defendants have at their disposal for their defense. And
sometimes the double standard is integral to the criminal justice policy
set by legislators; politicians can afford to be “tough on crime” because
society has already written off most of those on whom we will be
“tough.”
No one disputes that the criminal justice system’s legitimacy
depends on equality before the law, so demonstrating that we have not
lived up to that promise—this book’s first purpose—should be a
sufficient argument for demanding a remedy. It should require little
argument to maintain that as a moral matter we must take Justice Black’s
dictate about equal justice much more seriously if we are to remain true
to the first principle of criminal justice. We should do it because it is the
right thing to do. But my second task in writing this book is to
demonstrate that there are also strong pragmatic reasons for responding
to inequality in criminal justice, because a criminal justice system based
on double standards both fuels racial enmity and encourages crime.
The racially polarized reactions to the Simpson case illustrate a
deep and longstanding racial divide on issues of criminal justice: blacks
are consistently more skeptical of the criminal justice system than
whites. A long history of racially discriminatory practices in criminal
law enforcement has much to do with this skepticism, but it is not just a
matter of history: the double standards we rely on today in drawing the
lines between rights and law enforcement reinforce black alienation and
distrust. Because criminal law governs the most serious sanctions that a
society can impose on its members, inequity in its administration has
especially corrosive consequences. Perceptions of race and class
disparities in the criminal justice system are at the core of the race and
class divisions in our society.
The perception and reality of double standards also contribute to
the crime problem by eroding the legitimacy of the criminal law and
undermining a cohesive sense of community. As any wise ruler knows
(and many ineffective despots learn), the most effective way to govern is
not through brute force or terror, but by fostering broad social acceptance
for one’s policies. Where a community accepts the social rules as
legitimate, the rules will be largely self-enforcing. Studies have found
that most people obey the law not because they fear formal
punishment—the risk of actually being apprehended and punished is
infinitesimal for all crimes other than murder—but because they and
their peers have accepted and internalized the rules, and because they do
not want to let their community down. The rules will be accepted, and
community pressure to conform will be effective, only to the extent that
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“the community” believes that the rules are just and that the authority
behind them is legitimate. Thus, although the double standards I discuss
in this book were adopted for the purpose of reducing the costs of crime
associated with protecting constitutional rights, I argue that in the end
they undermine the criminal justice system’s legitimacy, and thereby
increase crime and its attendant costs.
When significant sectors of a community view the system as
unjust, law enforcement is compromised in at least two ways. First,
people feel less willing to cooperate with the system, whether by offering
leads to police officers, testifying as witnesses for the prosecution, or
entering guilty verdicts as jurors. Second, and more importantly, people
are more likely to commit crimes, precisely because the laws forbidding
such behavior have lost much of their moral force. When the law loses
its moral force, the only deterrents that remain are the strong-arm
methods of conviction and imprisonment. We should not be surprised,
then, that the United States has the second highest incarceration rate of
all developed nations. And it should be no wonder that black America,
which has been most victimized by the inequalities built into the criminal
justice system, is simultaneously most plagued by crime and most
distrustful of criminal law enforcement.
What is to be done? In the book’s final chapter, I suggest a series
of responses. The first step, of course, is to recognize the scope of the
problem. Although African Americans are generally skeptical of the
criminal justice system’s fairness, their skepticism is not shared by the
white majority, nor apparently by the courts. Until now, the courts and
legislatures have been extremely reluctant even to allow the issue of
inequality in criminal justice to be aired, and have instead impermissibly
exploited inequality to make the hard choices of criminal justice seem
easier. This book argues that a realistic response to crime, and in the end
our society’s survival as a cohesive community, depend on a candid
assessment of the uses of inequality in criminal justice.
The second step is to eliminate the double standards. This turns
out to be rather straightforward in some instances, but difficult if not
impossible in others. We could certainly require, for example, that
police officers seeking consent to search inform citizens that they have
the right to say no. But wealthy defendants will always be able to
outspend poor defendants; not everyone can afford Johnny Cochran.
Even an attempt to limit such disparities would be a reversal of the
current approach, however, which affirmatively exploits them. Such
reforms are necessary if the criminal justice system is to regain the
legitimacy so critical to effective law enforcement.
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But restoring legitimacy through adjusting the rules that govern
criminal law enforcement will not be nearly enough. The double
standards have also had a devastating impact on black communities,
particularly in poor, inner-city enclaves. The racial divide fostered and
furthered by inequality in criminal justice has contributed to a spiral of
crime and decay in the inner city, corroding the sense of belonging that
encourages compliance with the criminal law. Therefore, we cannot
limit ourselves to restoring the criminal law’s legitimacy, but must also
seek to restore the communities that have been doubly ravaged by crime
and the criminal justice system. To accomplish this, we must both
reinforce and support community-building organizations in the inner
cities, and change the way we respond to crime itself.
These remedies go hand in hand. In order to adopt a more
effective approach to criminal punishment, we must rebuild
communities. In order to rebuild communities, we must forgo our
reliance on mass incarceration—a policy that has robbed inner-city
neighborhoods of whole generations of young men. We respond to
crime today in a self-defeating way, by stigmatizing criminals, cutting
them off from their communities, and fostering criminal subcultures that
encourage further criminal behavior. In doing so, we undermine one of
the most important deterrents to crime: a sense of belonging to a lawabiding community. By the same token, to the extent that we reinforce
and reify divisions between the law-enforcing and law-breaking
communities, we encourage continuing criminal behavior. If we are to
reduce criminal recidivism, we must adopt measures that seek to
reintegrate offenders into the community, and that reinforce social ties
within and across communities.
This is an ambitious agenda. But unless all Americans begin to
see the problem of inequality in criminal justice as their own, and unless
we take responsible measures to respond to it, America’s crime problem
and racial divide will only get worse.
I. WHERE WE ARE TODAY
In the year and a half since the above first appeared in print, as
the introduction to No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American
Criminal Justice System, much has changed. The criminal justice system
remains dependent upon the exploitation of race and class inequities, but
public concern about that state of affairs has grown significantly. The
month the book was published, four white New York City police officers
shot Amadou Diallo, an unarmed West African immigrant, 41 times in
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Harlem.31 The incident led to massive public protests and extended civil
disobedience.32 Shortly thereafter, the New Jersey Attorney General
admitted that New Jersey State Police officers had engaged in racial
profiling.33 Since that time, there has been a steady drumbeat of media
attention to issues of race, class and criminal justice.
On some issues, real progress has already been made.
Government officials across the country, from President Clinton on
down, have condemned racial profiling. North Carolina and Connecticut
have enacted legislation requiring police to record and make public data
on the racial demographics of their traffic law enforcement patterns. In
other states and cities, executive officers have independently undertaken
such reporting. President Clinton has required reporting on all federal
law enforcement agencies. The Civil Rights Division has entered into
consent decrees with individual police departments addressed to, among
other things, the problem of racial profiling. And it’s difficult to find
anyone these days to defend the practice of racial profiling, a practice
that has been going on for decades without generating any public
scrutiny.
On other issues, we have only begun to recognize the problems.
In February 2000 the incarcerated population in the United States passed
the two million mark, and there has been growing criticism of the extent
to which we have relied on lock-’em-up-and-throw-away-the-key tactics
in responding to crime in general, and drugs in particular. But the White
House drug czar, Barry McCaffrey, consistently emphasizes the
importance of treatment alternatives to incarceration, and drug courts,
which provide such an alternative, have grown exponentially in the last
few years. There were 12 drug courts nationwide in 1994; today there
are more than 400, with 200 more in the planning stages.
Two years ago, New York’s aggressive “quality of life” policing
was widely hailed as the New York miracle. Today, the costs of
responding to crime much as an invading army might, by stopping and
arresting thousands of civilians for minor offenses in the hope of
reducing more serious crime, has substantial costs. The legitimacy of the
police force in New York has been gravely undermined, and the broader
public is beginning to be aware not only of the costs of such strategies,
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but of the availability of more community-friendly policing strategies
that have achieved equal drops in crime without the attendant increase in
arrests and complaints of police misconduct.
So there is reason for hope. As I argue in my book, the first step
toward reform is recognizing the extent of the problem, and there are
encouraging signs that the broader American public is beginning to pay
attention to this issue in a way we didn’t before. The newfound concern
may in part be a reflection of the fact that crime has dropped so
significantly over the past decade. As people begin to feel safe in their
neighborhoods again, they may have room to address other concerns in
the arena of criminal justice.
The question remains whether this newfound concern can be
harnessed and directed toward real reform. On that question,
unfortunately, the jury is still out. But it is my belief that once we
acknowledge the flaws of the current system, we have no choice but to
seek major reform.

